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Abstract. In appearance, Husserl’s writings seem not to have had any 
influence on linguistic research, nor does what the German philosopher wrote 
about language seem to be worth a place in the history of linguistics. The 
purpose of the paper is exactly to contrast this view, by reassessing both the 
position and the role of Husserl’s early masterpiece — the Logical Inves-
tigations — within the history of linguistics. To this end, I will focus mainly 
on the third (On the theory of wholes and parts) and fourth (The distinction 
between independent and non-independent meanings) Investigations, paying 
special attention to Husserl’s mereology and to the idea of a general pure 
grammar. The paper tries to situate the third and fourth Logical Investigation 
within the general context of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-
century linguistics and furthermore attempts to show the historical and 
theoretical importance of the Logical Investigations for the birth and the 
development of one of the most important linguistic “schools” of the 
twentieth century, namely structural linguistics. 
1. Husserl and the History of Linguistics 
In most histories of linguistics, it is usual to read that a nineteenth-century 
characterized by historical-comparative linguistics gives the way to a 
twentieth century marked by theoretical or general linguistics. The first 
expression, historical-comparative linguistics, indicates the branch of linguis-
tics which is concerned with the scientific study of language change over 
time, having as its principal goals the account of observed changes in 
particular languages, the reconstruction of the pre-history of languages, the 
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grouping of languages into language families on the basis of their supposed 
relatedness, the development of general theories about language change, the 
study of the history of words and of speech communities with the objective 
of gaining a better understanding of the phenomenon of linguistic change.1 
General or theoretical linguistics, on the other hand, is mostly interested in 
establishing “general principles for the study of all languages, and to 
determine the characteristics of human language as a phenomenon”,2 without 
being restricted to a particular language. It therefore involves the search of 
linguistic universals, that is of properties which are common to all human 
languages. 
Although the mentioned periodization represents a quite rough simpli-
fication — since theoretical and general approaches are in truth traceable also 
in nineteenth-century linguistics, most blatantly in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s 
inquiries, and historical linguistic studies were constantly growing also in the 
last century — it is nonetheless based on an indisputable historical fact: 
indeed, historical linguistics arises at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
with scholars like Bopp, Rask and Grimm and definitively defines its 
techniques and principles at the end of the century with the work of the so-
called neo-grammarian school, of which the German linguist Hermann Paul, 
mentioned by Husserl in the fourth investigation, can be considered a 
prominent exponent. On the other hand, as John Lyons notes in his Introduc-
tion to Theoretical Linguistics, already “[…] by the end of the eighteenth 
century there had developed a general dissatisfaction with a priori and so-
called ‘logical’ explanations and a preference for historical reasoning”.3 As a 
matter of fact, theoretical approaches were indeed less frequent in the 
nineteenth century, although present, and anyway not able to achieve 
systematic results and to develop a set of established common techniques 
until the early twentieth century and, more precisely, until the scientific work 
of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the consequent publication 
of the text which has been considered as his masterpiece, namely the Course 
de linguistique générale, which dates from 1916 and which opens the way to 
what has significantly been called “the Saussurean break”.4 
                                                     
1 Cf. L. Campbell, Historical Linguistics: An Introduction, The MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, 1999, p. 4-6. 
2 D. Crystal, A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics, Blackwell, Malden-Oxford-
Carlton, 2008, p. 284.  
3 J. Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995, p. 23.  
4 As is well known, the Cours de linguistique générale was actually published 
posthumously and consists of a transcription and reorganisation, conducted by 
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What is crucial in the Saussurean break is the introduction of a system-
ic approach. Indeed, as Émile Benveniste — one of the most influential 
linguists of the twentieth century — writes, “la nouveauté de sa doctrine est 
là, dans cette idée, riche d’implications qu’on mit longtemps à discerner et a 
développer, que la langue forme un système”.1 In fact, as stated by Saussure, 
“la langue est un système dont tous les termes sont solidaires et où valeur de 
l’un ne résulte que de la présence simultanée des autres”.2 “La langue”, 
Saussure writes in the third chapter of the first part of the book, “est un 
système dont toutes les parties peuvent et doivent être considérées dans leur 
solidarité synchronique”.3 According to this view, linguistics must therefore 
be defined as the science of language understood as a system of inter-
dependent elements and its objective must furthermore be in the first place, 
with Saussure’s words, “de chercher les forces qui sont en jeu d’un manière 
permanente et universelle dans toutes les langues, et de dégager les lois 
générales auxquelles on peut ramener tous les phénomènes particulier de 
l’histoire”.4 Thus, although in his 1916 masterpiece Saussure uses the word 
“structure” very rarely — and never in a technical sense — his linguistic 
theory nonetheless can be said to pave the way for twentieth-century 
theoretical approaches to language and, more specifically, to structural 
linguistics. In fact, in structural linguistics — as Roman Jakobson, a pro-
minent spokesperson for structural linguistics, writes in a 1958 essay — 
“[one] speak[s] about the grammatical and phonological system of language, 
about the laws of its structure, the interdependence of its parts, and of the 
parts and the whole”.5 As Émile Beveniste summarizes, 
[i]l s’agit donc, la langue étant posée comme système, d’en analyser la 
structure. Chaque système, étant formé d’unités qui se conditionnent mutuel-
lement, se distingue des autres systèmes par l’agencement interne de ces 
                                                                                                                             
C. Bally and A. Sechehaye, of notes taken down by students at lectures held by 
Saussure at the University of Geneva between 1907 and 1911. 
1 É. Benveniste, “‘Structure’ en linguistique”, in R. Bastide (ed.), Sens et usages du 
terme structure dans les sciences humaines et sociales, Mouton & Co., The Hague, 
1962, p. 32. 
2 F. de Saussure, Course de linguistique générale, Payot & Rivages, Paris, 1995, 
p. 159.  
3 Ibid., p. 124.  
4 Ibid., p. 20. 
5 R. Jakobson, “Typological Studies and Their Contribution to Historical 
Comparative Linguistics”, in Selected Writings I. Phonological Studies, Mouton & 
Co., The Hague, 1962, p. 525 (italics added). 
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unités, agencement qui en constitue la structure. Certaines combinaisons sont 
fréquentes, d’autres plus rares, d’autres enfin, théoriquement possibles, ne se 
réalisent jamais. Envisager la langue (ou chaque partie d’une langue, 
phonétique, morphologie, etc.) comme un système organisé par une structure 
à déceler et à décrire, c’est adopter le point de vue “structuraliste”.1 
As is well known, Husserl was among the first to develop, in the third 
Logical Investigation, a formal mereology, that is a formal study of the 
relations between parts and whole as described by Jakobson. A prominent 
contemporary philosopher like Kit Fine even wrote that “Husserl’s third 
Logical Investigation is perhaps the most significant treatise on the concept 
of part to be found in the philosophical literature”.2 Furthermore, in the 
Fourth Logical Investigation Husserl applies the results achieved in the third 
investigation to the field of meaning and language and aims to describe a set 
of formal laws governing the possible combinations between expressions — 
and hence, as we shall see, between meanings — of the type referred to by 
Benveniste. Moreover, Husserl makes explicit references to the history of 
linguistics and to contemporary linguists like, for instance, Heymann 
Steinthal, who was the teacher of many representatives of the neo-
grammarian school at the University of Berlin. 
Given the scientific framework that dominated linguistic studies in the 
years in which he writes his Logical Investigations — namely the years 
between 1894 and 1901 — Husserl’s stance on language turns out to be, 
then, neither expected nor ordinary. In fact, he sharply criticizes mainstream 
historical-comparative approaches to the study of language3 and instead 
considers his position as a revival and a development of, using Husserl’s 
words, “die alte Idee einer allgemeinen und sogar einer apriorischen Gram-
                                                     
1 É. Benveniste, “‘Structure’ en linguistique”, in R. Bastide (ed.), Sens et usages du 
terme structure dans les sciences humaines et sociales, Mouton & Co., The Hague, 
1962, p. 36. 
2 K. Fine, “Part-Whole”, in B. Smith, D.W. Smith (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Husserl, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 463.  
3 In the fourth Investigation, with reference to Steinthal’s position — which derives 
from an explicit contrast to general grammar and from a refusal of each and every 
logical approach to the study of language — Husserl writes: “Was Steinthal, der 
selbst auf der Gegenseite steht, einwendet, scheint durch unsere Unterscheidungen 
eine so klare Erledigung zu finden, daß von eingehender Kritik hier abgesehen 
werden kann” (E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. 
Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana, Vol. 
19 (1), hrsg. von U. Panzer, Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, p. 351). 
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matik”.1 The allusion, as is made explicit in the last pages of the fourth 
investigation, is to the Grammaire générale et raisonnée, otherwise known 
as the Port-Royal Grammar, developed by Antoine Arnauld and Claude 
Lancelot in the second half of the seventeenth century. Without going into 
further details, the Port-Royal Grammar can be said to be general, to the 
extent that is not concerned with specific languages but, on the contrary, 
aims to discover the universal features of human language in general and is 
furthermore reasoned insofar as it connects the functioning of language to the 
functioning of reason, namely to logic.2 
Moreover, Husserl’s stance towards the linguistic studies of his time is 
not only unusual but also completely aware, as shown by the following 
quotation taken from the fourth Logical Investigation: 
Nun ist in unserem naturwissenschaftlichen Zeitalter dafür gesorgt, daß 
empirisch-allgemeine Forschungen, wie überall, so in grammatischen Dingen, 
nicht unterlassen werden. Anders steht es mit den apriorischen, für die der 
Sinn in unserer Epoche fast zu verkümmern drohte, obschon doch alle 
prinzipiellen Einsichten auf sie zurückführen.3 
2. Mereology 
Husserl’s idea of an a priori or pure grammar, which can be seen both as a 
revival of the general conception of the Grammaire générale et raisonnée 
and as anticipation of twentieth-century structural linguistics, is based on the 
mereology developed by him in the third investigation. In this investigation, 
however, Husserl combines the mereological framework with an ontological 
commitment, insomuch as it is possible to consider this investigation as a 
study providing the outlines of a formal ontology, that is of an ontology 
                                                     
1 Ibid., p. 49.  
2 See R. Lakoff, “La Grammaire générale et raisonnée, ou la grammaire de Port-
Royal”, in H. Parret (ed.), History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguis-
tics, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1976, p. 349: “First, Lancelot and Arnauld 
assume that language is, at base, logical. Man is a logical animal, and his language 
must exemplify his logical nature. Since man’s nature is common to all men, all 
languages must share this logical basis. Therefore a grammar that is ‘générale’ must 
automatically be ‘raisonnée’: it is this assumption that distinguishes this book from 
an ordinary comparative grammar”.  
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen 
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana, Vol. 19 (1), hrsg. von 
U. Panzer, Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, p. 346.  
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whose concepts, as Barry and David Smith write, “are independent of any 
peculiar material of knowledge”.1 Given this ontological commitment, the 
mereology proposed by Husserl implies that the analysed relations between 
parts and wholes must be considered as relations between objects and set of 
objects, where the term “object” has to be understood in its broadest sense 
and precisely, according to the early Husserl, as simply indicating a 
representative non-contradictory content. Hence, a bottle, a feeling, a sound 
or an angel can all be described as objects while, for instance, a “square 
round” or a “wooden iron”, since contradictory, cannot.  
The first axiom, as we could also call it, of Husserl’s formal ontology 
says the following: “Jeder Gegenstand ist wirklicher oder möglicher Teil, d. 
h. es gibt wirkliche oder mögliche Ganze, die ihn einschließen”.2 This means 
that every object is always and necessarily part of a whole. In other words, it 
is impossible for an object to be absolutely and completely self-sufficient, 
since there is always a whole, real or possible, which contains it or which 
might contain it. Every object is then necessarily a part, it is then always 
included in a web of relations, which connects it with other objects. Hence, 
in this sense, all objects must be said to be, using Husserl’s wording, non-
independent. Still, there is another sense according to which objects, or parts, 
can instead be said to be relatively independent or relatively non-indepen-
dent. Husserl writes, 
[e]in Inhalt x ist relativ unselbständig zu einem Inhalt ß, bzw. zu dem durch ß 
und alle seine Teile bestimmten Gesamtinbegriff von Inhalten , wenn ein [...] 
reines Gesetz besteht, wonach überhaupt ein Inhalt der reinen Gattung x a 
priori nur in oder verknüpft mit anderen Inhalten aus dem durch ß be-
stimmten Gesamtinbegriff von reinen Inhaltsgattungen bestehen kann. 
Mangelt ein solches Gesetz, so nennen wir x relativ zu ß selbständig.3 
Thus, if an object “A” is connected with an object “B” through a law of 
necessary implication, this means that “A” is relatively non-independent 
towards “B”, while if the connection between “A” and “B” is of an arbitrary 
or accidental nature, one can say that “A” is relatively independent towards 
                                                     
1 B. Smith, D. W. Smith, “Introduction”, in B. Smith, D. W. Smith (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Husserl, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, 
p. 29. 
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen 
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana, Vol. 19 (1), hrsg. von 
U. Panzer, Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, p. 229.  
3 Ibid., p. 264. 
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“B”. On this basis, Husserl then formulates, in the third investigation, a 
number of laws concerning the kind of relation represented by necessary 
implication, for example the law according to which the existence of a whole 
“G” composed by the elements “A”, “B”, “C”, necessarily implies the 
existence of the elements “A”, “B” and “C”. 
Husserl calls the relation of necessary implication between two objects 
a relation of “foundation”, therefore we can say that an object “A” is 
relatively non-independent towards “B” if “A” is founded in “B” and, on the 
contrary, relatively independent if “A” is not founded in “B”. The kind of 
necessity Husserl speaks of, is not, as he writes, “[eine] subjektive 
Notwendigkeit, d. i. subjektive Unfähigkeit des Sich-nicht-anders-vorstellen-
könnens, sondern objektiv-ideale Notwendigkeit des Nicht-anders-sein-
könnens”.1 The kind of necessity that comes into play in the relations of 
independence and non-independence is namely an ontological necessity and 
not a mere psychological one.2 In a relation of independence, then, what 
prevents the being otherwise of something is, according to Husserl, 
das Gesetz, das sagt, es ist nicht bloß hier und jetzt so, sondern überhaupt, in 
gesetzlicher Allgemeinheit. Nun ist aber zu beachten, daß, wie die Notwen-
digkeit, von der hier, in unserer Erörterung der „unselbständigen“ Momente, 
die Rede ist, die Bedeutung einer in den sachlichen Wesen gründenden 
idealen oder apriorischen Notwendigkeit hat, so korrelativ die Gesetzlichkeit 
die Bedeutung einer Wesensgesetzlichkeit, also einer nicht-empirischen, un-
bedingt allgemeingültigen Gesetzlichkeit.3 
                                                     
1 Ibid., p. 242-3. 
2 “The necessity of supplementing non-indipendent parts with other parts arises out 
of a necessity in the nature of the things themselves, a necessity in the sense of the 
parts themselves”. (J. J. Drummond, “Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation: Parts 
and Wholes, Founding Connections, and the Synthetic A Priori”, in D.O. Dahlstrom 
(ed.), Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2003, p. 60). See also 
R. Sokolowski, “The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations”, in 
J.N. Mohanty (ed.), Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Nijhoff, 
The Hague 1977, p. 96: “The necessity of blending these different parts is not due to 
any psychological disposition in me or in my culture, but is grounded in the sense of 
the parts […] Each part, by virtue of what it is, contains within itself a rule dictating 
the necessary progression of supplements that it must possess […]”. 
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen 
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana, Vol. 19 (1), hrsg. von 
U. Panzer, Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, p. 243.  
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On the basis of these analyses, Husserl can then distinguish two kinds of sets, 
namely “aggregates” (Inbegriffe) and “wholes” (Ganzen). Aggregates are 
sets of objects, which stand together accidentally, that is without implying a 
relation of foundation, whereas by wholes Husserl understands 
einen Inbegriff von Inhalten, welche durch eine einheitliche Fundierung, und 
zwar ohne Sukkurs weiterer Inhalte umspannt werden. Die Inhalte eines 
solchen Inbegriffs nennen wir Teile. Die Rede von der Einheitlichkeit der 
Fundierung soll besagen, daß jeder Inhalt mit jedem, sei es direkt oder 
indirekt, durch Fundierung zusammenhängt.1 
I believe that the notion of “whole” (Ganzen) proposed by Husserl in the 
third investigation is perfectly comparable to the structuralist notion of 
“structure”. After all, as Göran Sonesson has noted in a recent article on 
structuralism, “structure has to be studied within a more complete mereo-
logical framework, that is, within the science of parts and their relation to the 
whole, first defined by Twardowski and Husserl”.2 Moreover, just in the 
same way as for the notion of structure, a whole is not merely the resulting 
sum of its components. When one perceives a complex object like, for 
instance, a table, one does not simply perceive the sum of its components but 
rather the table as a unitary whole, as a structure, that is primarily as a 
homogeneous arrangement composed by a set of elements and of inter-
connected relations, a set which can then be broken into different parts like, 
in the case of the table, its legs and surface and into different relations like, 
for instance, the “being-beneath” of the legs of the table in regard to its 
surface. 
3. Pure Grammar 
In the fourth investigation, Husserl applies this theoretical framework to a 
very special domain of objects, namely to expressions, which, in the 
terminology of the Logical Investigations, means linguistic signs which bear 
a meaning, that is a reference to a class of objects.3 Like every kind of 
                                                     
1 Ibid., p. 282. 
2 G. Sonesson, “The Meanings of Structuralism. Considerations on Structures and 
Gestalten, with Particular Attention to the Masks of Lévi-strauss”, Segni e Compren-
sione, XXVI, No. 78, 2004, p. 84.  
3 In the first logical investigation, Husserl writes: “Zum Begriff des Ausdrucks 
gehört es, eine Bedeutung zu haben. Eben dies unterscheidet ihn ja von den sonstigen 
Bull. anal. phén. XI 5 (2015) 
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objects, expressions are also either independent — and in this case they bear 
an independent meaning — or non-independent — and in this case they bear 
a non-independent meaning. Since in the fourth investigation Husserl is 
primarily interested in the possible relations between expressions, and 
therefore between meanings, he mainly focuses his attention on sets of 
expressions, namely on what he calls complex expressions like, for instance, 
the sentence “a king who wins the love of his subjects”. Husserl then 
distinguishes between what he calls, following the terminology proposed by 
the philosopher and linguist Anton Marty, syncategorematic expressions like, 
in the exemplifying sentence, “a”, “who”, “the”, “of”, “his”, and categore-
matic expressions such as, in this case, “king”, “wins”, “love”, “subjects”. 
Syncategoremata are, according to Husserl, “Zeichen […] welche nur 
mit anderen Redebestandteilen zusammen eine vollständige Bedeutung 
haben”,1 while categorematica are “für sich bedeutsamen oder vollständigen 
Ausdrücke”.2 In fact, the syncategorematic expression “who” has no 
meaning outside the complex expression in which it occurs, while the 
categorematic expression “king” maintains his meaning even if isolated from 
the broader expression in which it occurs. Thus, meanings borne by 
syncategorematic expressions are always non-independent, while meanings 
borne by categorematic expressions are always independent. This means that 
non-independent meanings are, following the terminology introduced by 
Husserl in the third investigation, always founded (fundiert) in other 
meanings, that is to say that they necessarily imply other meanings in order 
to be, in turn, meaningful themselves. Indeed, while the isolated expression 
“king” can be said to have a complete meaning for itself, the isolated 
expression “who” has no meaning unless connected with other expressions 
like, for instance, in the sentence “the king, who…”.  
                                                                                                                            
“Zu jedem Fall einer unselbständigen Bedeutung”, Husserl then writes, 
“gehört […] ein gewisses Wesensgesetz, welches ihre Ergänzungs-
bedürftigkeit durch neue Bedeutungen regelt, also die Arten und Formen von 
 
Zeichen [...] Ein bedeutungsloser Ausdruck ist also, eigentlich zu reden, überhaupt 
kein Ausdruck [...] In der Bedeutung konstituiert sich die Beziehung auf den 
Gegenstand. Also einen Ausdruck mit Sinn gebrauchen und sich aus- drückend auf 
den Gegenstand beziehen (den Gegenstand vorstellen) ist einerlei” (E. Husserl, 
Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänome-
nologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana, Vol. 19 (1), hrsg. von U. Panzer, 
Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, p. 59). 
1 Ibid., p. 311. 
2 Ibid., p. 312. 
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Zusammenhängen nachweist, in denen sie eingeordnet sein muß”.1 The study 
and identification of these laws of essence concerning the possible com-
binations of expressions within language is exactly the concern of what 
Husserl calls “pure grammar”. Indeed, according to Husserl, “[e]s gibt im 
Bedeutungsgebiete apriorische Gesetzmäßigkeiten, wonach Bedeutungen bei 
Erhaltung eines wesentlichen Kerns [...] in neue Bedeutungen umzuwandeln 
sind”.2 Take, for instance, the complex expression “the tree is green”. Of 
course one can vary the form of this expression in many different ways 
producing new expressions like “the tree is beautiful”, “the kid is green”, 
“the green is beautiful”, but not every variation turns out to be in truth 
possible. Indeed, expressions like “the kid is the.”, “the green is or.”, “the or 
is the.” cannot be considered as possible combinations. According to Husserl, 
the impossibility of these combinations 
ist eine wesensgesetzliche, d. h. zunächst, sie ist keine bloß subjektive, es 
liegt nicht bloß an unserer faktischen Unfähigkeit (an dem Zwange unserer 
“geistigen Organisation”), daß wir die Einheit nicht vollziehen können. In den 
Fällen, die wir hier im Auge haben, ist die Unmöglichkeit vielmehr eine 
objektive, ideale, in der “Natur”, im reinen Wesen des Bedeutungsgebietes 
gründende und als solche durch apodiktische Evidenz zu erfassen.3 
What Husserl means, is that the kind of possibility and impossibility involv-
ed in the considered combinations of expressions does not limit itself to a 
specific empirical language or to a particular individual psychological 
speaker but rather concerns universal foundational laws which determine the 
semantic and syntactic organization of language as such.4 In fact, according 
to Husserl, 
die Sprache nicht bloß ihre physiologischen, psychologischen und kultur-
historischen, sondern auch ihre apriorischen Fundamente hat. Letzteres 
betrifft die wesentlichen Bedeutungsformen und die apriorischen Gesetze 
                                                     
1 Ibid., p. 325. 
2 Ibid., p. 332. 
3 Ibid., p. 326. 
4 Cf. E.W. Orth, “Philosophy of Language as Phenomenology of Language and 
Logic”, in M. Natanson (ed.), Phenomenology and the Social Sciences. Volume I, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973, p. 342: “On the level of logical and 
epistemological reflection […] language has become important in a twofold respect: 
once as a system of ‘meanings’ and […] as a so-called ‘pure logical grammar’. The 
one could be called Husserl’s contribution to semantics, the other his contribution to 
syntax”. 
Bull. anal. phén. XI 5 (2015) 
http://popups.ulg.ac.be/1782-2041/ © 2015 ULg BAP 
10
ihrer Komplexion bzw. Modifikation, und keine Sprache ist denkbar, die 
durch dieses Apriori nicht wesentlich mitbestimmt wäre […] Wieviel vom 
tatsächlichen Inhalt der historischen Sprachen sowie von ihren gramma-
tischen Formen in dieser Weise empirisch bestimmt sein mag, an dieses 
ideale Gerüst ist jede gebunden; und so muß die theoretische Erforschung 
desselben eines der Fundamente für die letzte wissenschaftliche Klärung aller 
Sprache überhaupt ausmachen […] Man muß es vor Augen haben, um 
sinnvoll fragen zu können: Wie drückt das Deutsche, das Lateinische, 
Chinesische usw. „den“ Existenzialsatz, „den“ kategorischen Satz, „den“ 
hypothetischen Vordersatz, „den“ Plural, „die“ Modalitäten des „möglich“ 
und „wahrscheinlich“, das „nicht“ usw. aus?1 
As Husserl writes in the passage just quoted, there are, according to him, two 
main classes of essential laws concerning the field of expressions, that is of 
meaningful signs, namely laws of compounding (Komplexion) and laws of 
modification (Modifikation). While the first ones establish the possibility or 
impossibility of certain combinations between meanings or, better, between 
meaning categories,2 the second ones govern the way in which the regular 
functioning of the first ones can be altered by means of a transformation of a 
meaning category into another one, as in the cases of nominalization, in 
which verbs, adjectives, adverbs, etc. are used as nouns.  
An example of what Husserl understands by a law of compounding, is 
represented by the following rule: “[es] gehört zu je zwei nominalen 
Bedeutungen M und N die primitive Verknüpfungsform M und N, mit dem 
Gesetze, daß das Verknüpfungsresultat wieder eine Bedeutung derselben 
Kategorie ist”.3 With reference instead to the laws of modification, Husserl 
gives, among others,4 the following example: 
                                                     
1 Ibid., p. 74.  
2 Husserl identifies in particular, without any pretense of completeness, four meaning 
categories, namely nominal, adjectival, relative and propositional meanings. Cf. also 
M. A. Gonzàlez Porta, “La Idea de una Morfología de la Significación o Gramática 
Universal en la 4ª Investigación Lógica de Husserl”, Cognitio, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2008. 
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen 
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana, Vol. 19 (1), hrsg. von 
U. Panzer, Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, p. 338.  
4 As M.A. Gonzàlez Porta sums up, Husserl explicitly considers seven cases of 
modification: (1) Suppositio materialis: an expression occurs as name of itself; (2) 
Suppositio formalis: A term refers to what is usually his normal meaning; (3) 
Nominalization of adjectives; (4) Nominalization of declaratory judgements; (5) 
Inversion of antecedent and consequent in a conditional statement; (6) shift of 
adjectives from the predicative to the attributive function; (7) shift of nouns from 
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Jeder Ausdruck, gleichgültig ob er — in seiner normalen Bedeutung — ein 
kategorematischer oder synkategorematischer ist, kann danach als Name von 
sich selbst auftreten, d. h. er nennt sich selbst als grammatische Erscheinung 
[…] Sagen wir „und“ ist eine Konjunktion, so haben wir nicht das Bedeu-
tungsmoment, das dem Worte und normalerweise entspricht, an die Subjekt-
stelle gebracht, sondern hier steht die selbständige, auf das Wort und 
gerichtete Bedeutung. In dieser anomalen Bedeutung ist das und in Wahrheit 
kein synkategorematischer, sondern ein kategorematischer Ausdruck, es nennt 
sich selbst als Wort.1 
On the basis of these analyses, Husserl distinguishes two kinds of possible 
incompatibilities. On the one hand, he designates with the term Nonsense 
(Unsinn) all the incompatibilities deriving from the violation of the laws of 
compounding, whereas, on the other hand, he labels with the term Absurdity 
(Widersinn) a special class of complex meanings, namely the class of 
complex meanings whose reference objects are contradictory.  
In the first case, we are faced with no more than aggregates of 
meanings, with mere sums of meanings, which stand together in a totally 
arbitrary and accidentally way, without implying any form of necessary 
interaction and which therefore cannot be described as wholes. The examples 
made by Husserl on this regard include sentences like “A round or.”, “A man 
and is.”, etc.2 
In the second case, instead, we deal with complex meanings which do 
not violate any law of compounding and which are not, accordingly, mere 
aggregates but can, on the contrary, be considered as proper wholes. 
However, since the objects these complex meanings refer to are contradict-
ory, the meanings forming the whole can still be said to be, to some degree, 
incompatible with each other, insofar as they hinder the normal functioning 
                                                                                                                             
subject position to object position. For more details, Cf. M.A. Gonzàlez Porta, “La 
Idea de una Morfología de la Significación o Gramática Universal en la 4ª 
Investigación Lógica de Husserl”, Cognitio, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2008, p. 47. 
1 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen 
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana, Vol. 19 (1), hrsg. von 
U. Panzer, Nijhoff, The Hague-Boston-Lancaster, 1984, p. 330-1. 
2 “It is completely obvious that so combined no meaning exists, or can possibly exist, 
for [such expressions]. On no account can they refer to any object. Moreover, not 
only is there not any question of reference to objects, but there is not any question of 
truth either. They break the laws about what can be meaningful. Meaning itself is 
missing”. (C. Ortiz Hill, “Incomplete Symbols, Dependent Meanings, and Paradox”, 
in D.O. Dahlstrom (ed.), Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2003, 
p. 73). 
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of the process of reference. Typical examples of absurdity are then, accord-
ing to Husserl, expressions like “the round square” or «the wooden iron”. 
4. Conclusion: Husserl and Structural Linguistics 
On the basis of the line of reasoning outlined above, it is now possible to 
highlight some substantial theoretical and historical affinities between struc-
tural linguistics and early phenomenology, to the extent that is even possible 
to consider the Logical Investigations as one of the fundamental sources of 
linguistic structuralism.1 Indeed, although it is true that there seem to be no 
direct contacts between Saussure’s and Husserl’s works, it is on the other 
hand true that there are many meeting points, both at historical and 
theoretical levels, between Husserl’s early philosophy and the scientific 
activity of Roman Jakobson and, more generally, of the other members of the 
Prague linguistic circle, founded in 1926 by the Czech linguist Vilem 
Mathesius and considered, together with the Copenhagen school, the place in 
which structural linguistics took its most rigorous form.2 Jakobson is certain-
ly the scholar who brings the claims of early phenomenology — and above 
all of the Logical Investigation3 — most clearly into the field of structural 
                                                     
1 For a criticism of this line of thinking, cf. P. Swiggers, “The relationships between 
Phenomenology and Structuralism: Some Critical Remarks”, Ars Semiotica, Vol. 4, 
No. 3, 1981, p. 263-8.  
2 Cf. M. Dennes, “L’influence de Husserl en Russie au début du XXe siècle et son 
impact sur les émigrés russes de Prague”, Cahiers de l’ILSL, No. 9, 1997, p. 60: 
“Finalement, quelles que soient les voies empruntées et les domaines parcourus, nous 
sommes amenés à conclure en soulignant que la phénoménologie husserlienne, telle 
qu'elle a été reçue et interprétée en Russie, a marqué le Cercle linguistique de Prague 
dans toutes les étapes de son développement. Nous ne pouvons même pas parler de 
sa plus ou moins grande influence selon les orientations ou les domaines privilégiés, 
car c'est au niveau de l'adoption d'une méthode et de la délimitation des régions à 
parcourir que la phénoménologie a laissé son empreinte, et à ce niveau-là elle avait 
déjà pénétré, en Russie, tous les cercles philosophiques, linguistiques ou littéraires 
qui devaient avoir ensuite, à leur tour, quelque impact sur les activités ou les 
orientations du Cercle Linguistique de Prague”.  
3 The first translation of the Logical Investigations into a foreign language is 
represented by the Russian translation of 1909, which however includes only the first 
volume of the German edition, namely the Prolegomena to a Pure Logic. As Elmar 
Holenstein reminds us, then, “[a]ls Jakobson 1914/1915 seine Universitätsstudien 
begann, war Husserl in Rußland nicht nur präsent, er war aktuell” (E. Holenstein, 
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linguistics. Indeed, Jakobson explicitly considers Husserl’s phenomenology 
as one of the main sources underlying Prague structuralism and Russian for-
malism and, more specifically, defines Husserl’s third Logical Investigation 
as “[eine] strukturalistische Fundamentalbetrachtung”.1 It is significant to 
notice that, in some cases, Jakobson even uses, as Holenstein observes, “[die] 
von Husserl […] inspirierten Formulierung (‘Fundierung’ statt ‘Implika-
tion’)”.2 Furthermore, it is noteworthy to mention that on the 18th of 
November 1935, at the invitation of Jakobson himself, Husserl gave a 
                                                                                                                             
Linguistik Semiotik Hermeneutik. Plädoyers für eine strukturale Phänomenologie, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, p. 15).  
1 Cf. E. Holenstein, Linguistik Semiotik Hermeneutik. Plädoyers für eine strukturale 
Phänomenologie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, p. 13: “Gefragt nach den 
Anregungen zur neuen Konzeption von Sprache und Linguistik, wie sie im 
Russichen Formalismus und im Prager Strukturalismus zum Durchbruch gekommen 
ist, nennt Roman Jakobson […]: die linguistische Schule von Kazan um Baudouin de 
Courtenay, Ferdinand de Saussures Cours de linguistique générale (1916), die 
phänomenologische Philosophie Husserls und die avantgardistischen Strömungen in 
Dichtung, Malerei und Musik zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts […] In diesem Sinne 
bildet die Phänomenologie die historische und sachliche Bedingung der Möglichkeit 
des Strukturalismus”. See also p. 16: “In der III. Untersuchung sieht Jakobson das, 
was […] als strukturalistische Fundamentalbetrachtung bezeichnen kann. Dabei 
setzt Jakobson Rezeption der Logische Untersuchungen keineswegs einer Neben-
sache an”. Cf. also E. Holenstein, Roman Jakobsons phänomenologischer Struk-
turalismus, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1975. 
2 E. Holenstein, Sprachliche Universalien. Eine Untersuchung zur Natur des 
menschlischen Geistes, Brockmeyer, Bochum, 1985, p. 120. See also Jan Patočka’s 
review of Holenstein’s book of 1976, where the Czech philosopher writes: “Es ist 
charakteristisch, daß Jakobson für die Kennzeichnung der systematischen ‚hierar-
chischen’ Ordnung der phonematischen Einheiten auf den Husserlschen Fun-
dierungsbegriff der III. Logischen Untersuchung rekurriert” (J. Patočka, “Roman 
Jakobsons phänomenologischer Strukturalismus”, in J. Patočka, Texte, Dokumente, 
Bibliographie, Karl Alber/ΟΙΚΟΥΜΕΝΗ, Freiburg-München/Prag, 1999, p. 411. 
For an example of Jakobson’s usage of the term “Fundierung” see, for instance, 
R. Jakobson, “Kindersprache, Aphasie, und allgemeine Lautgesetze”, in R. Jakob-
son, Selected Writings I. Phonological Studies, Mouton & co, The Hague, 1962, 
p. 362: “Die Existenz der hinteren Konsonanten in den Sprachen der Welt schliesst 
dementsprechend das Mitbestehen der vorderen Konsonanten ein; und im einzelnen: 
k ebenso wie c (bzw. ŋ wie ø) bedarf der Fundierung durch p und t (bzw. durch m 
und n), und x ebenso wie ſ bedarf der Fundierung durch f oder s und ausserdem 
durch k oder c ” (italics added). 
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lecture, entitled Phänomenologie der Sprache and unfortunately lost, at the 
Prague linguistic circle.1 
Moreover, without being able to go into further details here, it is 
important to mention the relevance of the role played by two fundamental, 
although rather neglected, mediators between Husserl’s phenomenology and 
Jakobson’s linguistic thought, namely Gustav Špet and Hendrik Pos, to 
whose works Patrick Flack has interestingly drawn attention recently. 2 
Also on the Danish side of structural linguistics, the influence of 
Husserl is, although less evident, certainly significant. The three kinds of 
dependence identified by Hjelmslev in the Prolegoma to a Theory of 
Language, for instance, are closely connected to the relations of foundation 
(Fundierung) distinguished by Husserl in the third Logical Investigation.3 
Moreover, the influence of Husserl becomes explicit as soon as we turn to 
other members of the Copenhagen school like Viggo Brøndal and Paul 
Diderichsen, this latter a student of both Hjelmslev and Brøndal. Indeed, 
while Diderichsen, as reminded by Federik Stjernfelt, “[a]t several occasions, 
remarks upon the complete similarity between the dependence calculi of the 
                                                     
1 So, as Patrick Flack, summarizes, “il y a eu dans les années 1930, à Prague, une 
véritable rencontre entre la phénoménologie et la linguistique structurale, comme en 
attestent notamment les nombreuses prises de position de Roman Jakobson à ce 
propos, ou encore la conférence donnée par Edmund Husserl en 1935 au Cercle 
Linguistique de Prague, sur invitation expresse des membres de celui-ci” (P. Flack, 
“Le moment phénoménologique de la linguistique structurale”, Cahiers de l’ILSL, 
No. 37, 2013, p. 118). 
2 As Flack writes, “[o]n peut trouver non pas une mais deux sources tout à fait 
significatives pour les rapports entre structuralisme et phénoménologie. Il s’agit 
d’une part du philosophe russe G. Špet, et du philosophe et linguiste néerlandais 
H. Pos d’autre part. Tous deux orientent la pensée husserlienne dans une direction 
bien plus ‘réaliste’ et compatible avec les objectifs de la linguistique structurale, tous 
deux, de plus, ont exercé une influence parfaitement avérée sur Jakobson” (P. Flack, 
“Le moment phénoménologique de la linguistique structurale”, Cahiers de l’ILSL, 
No. 37, 2013, p. 122). Cf. also Flack’s introduction to H. Pos, Écrits sur le langage, 
Sdvig Press, Geneve-Lausanne, 2013, p. 9-26. 
3 “It is striking that Hjelmslev here as the basis for his theory of languages takes 
three mereological types of dependencies very well known in Brentanist tradition. 
We find them in Brentano, for instance, and at a prominent place in the 3rd LU where 
[there is] the identical distinction between ‘gegenseitige’, ‘einseitige’, and no 
relation, respectively” (F. Stjernfelt, Diagrammatology. An Investigation on the 
Borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, 
p. 168).  
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Prolegomena [to a Theory of Language] and Logical Investigations”,1 
Brøndal, for his part, concludes an important essay of 1939 with the 
following passage, which is worth quoting in its entirety, given the similari-
ties in the usage of mereological notions in relation to the conceptual frame-
work developed by Husserl in the third and fourth investigation: 
On a conçu […] la structure comme objet autonome et par conséquent comme 
non-dérivable des éléments dont elle n’est ni l’agrégat ni la somme; c’est 
pourquoi il faut considérer l’étude des systèmes possibles et de leur forme 
comme étant de la plus grande importance. — Et pourtant on ne saurait 
considérer les éléments qui font partie d’un système comme de simples 
dérivés des corrélations ou oppositions structurales; il sera en effet important 
de distinguer entre les propriétés purement formelles d’un système et sa ma-
tière ou substance qui, tout en étant adaptée à la structure donnée (puisqu’elle 
y entre), n’en est pas moins relativement indépendante; et l’étude des 
catégories réelles, contenu ou base des systèmes, sera non moins importante 
que celle de la structure formelle. Les méditations pénétrantes de Husserl sur 
la phénoménologie seront ici une source d’inspiration pour tout logicien du 
langage.2 
Finally, from a theoretical point of view, it is possible to sum up — on the 
basis of the analyses developed in the second and third section of the present 
paper — the main debts owed by structural linguistics towards Husserl’s 
early phenomenology in the following points: 
 
(1) The mereological framework and the concept of whole. 
(2) The predilection of theoretical, general, a priori and formal approaches 
to the study of language and the consequent criticism of (linguistic) 
psychologism,3 that is of the view according to which “language has to 
be understood and explained through psychology”,4 namely through 
an empirical and experimental science that can provide mere factual, 
                                                     
1 Ibid.  
2 V. Brøndal, “Linguistique structurale”, in V. Brøndal, Essais de linguistique 
générale, Munksgaard, Copenhague, 1943, p. 97.  
3 As Wolf-Dieter Stempel notes with reference to linguistics of the 1920s and 1930s, 
“[d]ezidiert Stellung gegen den verbreiteten Psychologismus beziehen konnte zur 
damaligen Zeit nur bedeuten, bei Husserls Lehre anzuschließen […]” (W.-D. Stem-
pel, Gestalt, Ganzheit, Struktur. Aus Vor- und Frühgeschichte des Strukturalismus in 
Deutschland, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1978, p. 15). 
4 G. Graffi, 200 Years of Syntax, John Benjamins, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, 2001, 
p. 31. 
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contingent and particular rules but no logically necessary objective 
truths. 
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